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Abstract
This study seeks to fill gaps in our understanding of how private actors participate in
international human rights politics by examining civil society involvement in European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) cases against long-standing democracies. Descriptive
analysis of an exhaustive data set of instances of civil society organization (CSO)
participation in ECtHR cases against Germany and The Netherlands is complemented
by a comparative case study analysis of networks of organizations that mobilized
around German and Dutch cases concerning Articles 8 (right to privacy) and 10
(freedom of expression). The data suggest that civil society organizations not only
appear before the ECtHR for financial or moral redress when rights violations have
occurred, but also that some CSOs use strategic litigation to pursue their sector policy
preferences when the opportunity for an impactful legal development arises.
Keywords: Human rights; civil society organization; strategic litigation; legal
mobilization; judicialization of human rights; European Court of Human Rights;
ECtHR.
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Introduction
Since the end of World War II, the international community has forged human
rights and criminal accountability systems that have since been increasingly legalized
and judicialized, gaining furthered recognition and importance as they investigate
allegations of abuse, try accused and offer accountability and reparations to victims—
functions which domestic institutions oftentimes cannot fulfill. In Europe, post-war
commitments to protect democracy, human rights and the rule of law led to the
development of the ‘European Union’ (EU) treaties and the European Convention on
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention), both of
which have facilitated increasing European integration and constitute important
contemporary sources of European law.
The European Court of Human Rights (herein after ECtHR or the Court), the
body which oversees the implementation of the Convention, has created an expanding
opportunity for rights claims beyond domestic courts within its 47 member states.
Having handed down over 15,000 judgments and receiving nearly 50,000 new petitions
each year, by most measures, the ECtHR has been very successful (Hillebrecht 2014).
It is important to note that with the advancement of these supranational
tribunals, individuals find themselves increasingly governed by “a dense and binding
set of international laws and norms—often policies constructed with little or no direct
electoral participation by society” (Cichowski 2016). These policy determinations are
instead influenced by the individuals, interest groups and companies that access the
Court as direct claimants, legal representation or third-party interveners. However,
cross-national variation in legal mobilization by these actors has been identified and
studied, but the lack of a solid framework to account for these differences constitutes a
notable gap in the understanding of the processes that lead to the creation of important
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supranational policy (Conant 2016). Moreover, a growing literature about legal
mobilization has explored how and why these actors interact with the Court to advance
their interests and a number of findings have led scholars to question the degree to
which these judicial processes strengthen (Cichowski 2006a) or damage (Dehousse
2000) principles of democratic participation.
Scholars have recognized that a deeper understanding of the causes of variation
in legal mobilization across Europe is needed before normative conclusions can be
drawn about these trends, but most analyses of civil society participation at the Court
are centered around states with the highest violation rates (Conant et al. 2018).
Recognizing the need for systematic analysis of legal mobilization patterns, Cichowski
and Chrun have compiled a database, The European Court of Human Rights Database
(ECHRdb), which enables the examination of judgments and legal mobilization patterns
of different actors at the Court, but much of the data has yet to be analyzed (Cichowski
and Chrun 2017). Recognizing that the majority of literature exploring participation at
the European Court of Human Rights is centered around cases originating in the
weaker democratic states that most often appear before the Court, this study instead
seeks to contribute to the growing literature on participation in international judicial
politics by completing an in-depth analysis of legal mobilization by civil society
organizations concerning two long-standing democracies (democratic from 1946 on),
Germany and The Netherlands.
The first section of this study offers an overview of the existing literature
concerning participation by non-state actors at international tribunals, concluding with
the argument that the judicialization of international human rights in the European
context provides increased opportunity for civil society actors to pursue regional policy
preferences via strategic litigation at the ECtHR. The following section provides a
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detailed overview of participation by civil society organizations in ECtHR cases
concerning Germany and The Netherlands, employing descriptive analysis of an
exhaustive data set of instances of participation by civil society organizations in cases
against both countries. The descriptive analysis is followed by a comparative case study
of networks of actors involved in ECtHR cases regarding the right to privacy and
freedom of speech, which exemplifies the strategic nature that can characterize civil
society organization involvement in international human rights litigation. A brief
summary of this study’s findings and their implications for future research conclude
this analysis.

Relevant Literature and Theory
A number of scholars have sought to illustrate how non-state actors use
international courts, signaling a shifting balance of power between citizens,
governments, and international organizations that has led to transformations in
democratic participation in global governance (Cichowski 2006b; Alter 2006).
Judgments by international courts have proven to result in far-reaching policy reforms,
often against member state preferences (Cichowski 1998), sparking a debate among
scholars whether increased power for and access to international courts enhance
(Cichowski 2013; 2006a; Alter 2006) or damage (Dehousse 2000; Rubenfeld 2004)
principles of democratic participation. Indeed, Alter observes a sharp increase in the
number of international courts with a “new-style” design throughout the globe, which
have both compulsory jurisdiction (they can compel member states to litigate before
them) and private access (non-state actors can participate in decisions), meaning that
non-state actors are increasingly gaining access to international lawmaking institutions
(Alter 2006). In light of this proliferation of international courts with heightened public
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access, it is important to understand the relationship between that heightened access
and the fulfillment of democratic principles.
In the context of the European Court of Human Rights, many scholars argue that
the body’s supranational authority to decide on questions of human rights practices,
combined with its “new-style” jurisdiction and access design, increase opportunity for
participation in international rights development through law enforcement, rights
claiming, and expanded protections (Cichowski 2006a). Alter adopts a neo-functionalist
approach to participation at the venue, contending that compulsory jurisdiction and
private access are in fact necessary for the fulfillment of rights claiming, constitutional
(or conventional) review, and law enforcement roles, all of which the ECtHR seeks to
fill (Alter 2006).
Provided the lack of consensus concerning the democratic—or antidemocratic—
nature of non-state actor involvement with international politics via supranational
tribunals, a number of authors first seek to explain how and why actors participate in
international litigation before contributing to the normative debate. Findings by authors
working with this topic are many and overlapping. Cichowski identifies three variables
expected to cause variation in participation at international courts: the nature and scope
of rules and regulations that define what claims actors can make in court; the relative
power of nonmajoritarian organizations (like the ECtHR) to review acts of public
officials and member state governments; and the degree of access and amount of
resources supporting private access to the institution (Cichowski 2006b). In line with
Cichowski’s third variable, Börzel notably identifies rules of access to international
courts and the availability of social, financial, and intellectual resources as important
determining factors in an actor’s likelihood to mobilize international law, finding that
“actors poor of organizational and resources capacities […] stand little chance to benefit
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from the increased opportunities for participation through EU law enforcement”
(Börzel 2006). In addition to supporting Börzel’s findings, Vanhala identifies identity
politics and the ‘meaning frames,’ (i.e., the processes by which organizations arrive at
collective action frames) of civil society organizations, as informing non-state actors’
decision to use international courts (Vanhala 2009).
Conant similarly argues that the legal consciousness of societal actors, along with
the availability of support structures for individual victims of human rights violations
are likely to determine legal mobilization, much like Sundstrom, who finds that specific
training on how to use the ECtHR and the particular backgrounds of activists and their
organizations influence their likelihood to use the ECtHR as an advocacy strategy
(Conant 2016; Sundstrom 2014). At this point, an overview of the literature relevant to
the topic of participation by civil society actors in supranational judicial bodies
demonstrates that, while there is a general consensus among scholars that the
judicialization of international law has resulted in the opening up of a sphere that has
traditionally been closed to high-level officials, the questions of what explains variation
in public participation in its process and whether that participation leads to positive or
negative democratic outcomes remain unanswered.
Departing from the question of what motivates and discourages actors to turn to
international litigation, Van den Eynde instead focuses on the growing presence of
human rights organizations (HROs), or specialized, non-profit organizations that seek
to promote human rights, in judgements before the Court, finding a notable uptick in
amicus curiae (Latin for ‘friend of the court’) submissions, not only by HROs, but also by
more specialized groups such as professional associations and even conservative
groups (Van den Eynde 2013). The practice of accepting amicus briefs (sometimes called
third party or ‘sword-fighting’ intervention) allows an actor who is not a direct party to
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the case to intervene to provide legal expertise, factual information, or insight into
public interests (Bartholomeusz 2005). In the context of the European Court of Human
Rights, any group or individual can request permission to intervene on a case to submit
an intervention and Cichowski argues that this mode of involvement at the Court
provides non-state actors with increased opportunity to play a direct role in the
development of international human rights law, finding that a myriad of civil society
groups, HROs, and professional associations take advantage of this opportunity to
initiate significant supranational policy reforms (Cichowski 2016).
The possibility of achieving an enforceable set of policy goals via international
litigation is an important feature of the European Court of Human Rights. Strategic
litigation, defined as litigation “that seeks to change the law or how it is applied, in a
way that will affect society as a whole”, is a well-employed method by human rights
practitioners at the ECtHR, who have successfully expanded protections for gross
human rights violations in addition to attaining moral and financial redress for victims
(Rekosh, Buchko, and Terzieva 2001; Solvang 2008). In fact, in the regional context of
Europe, Kelemen argues that the economic liberalization resulting from the Single
Market initiative and the fragmentation of power both horizontally and vertically
within the region have driven private actors to use international litigation to pursue
their policy preferences, resulting in the spread of the ‘adversarial legalism’ that has
notably produced far-reaching policy reforms in the United States (Kelemen 2006).
The arguments presented by Solvang and Kelemen are interesting because they
explore the possibility of participation in international law development motivated by a
function beyond traditional dispute resolution and provision of redress (Solvang 2008;
Kelemen 2006). At the European Court of Human Rights, which is often thought of as a
venue of last resort for the most vulnerable residents within its jurisdiction to receive

KOVARIK 9
moral and financial redress for rights violations, judges indeed dispose of the authority
to revise laws and practices of member states, at times producing new supranational
human rights standards that are enforceable across the region (Solvang 2008).
Within the literature that has been mentioned insofar, most analyses of private
actor participation understandably are concentrated around participation in ECtHR
cases against the member states with the highest violation rates, notably Russia
(Sundstrom 2014); high-profile issue areas, such as torture and gender discrimination
(Conant 2016; Vanhala 2009); or a specific mode of participation, such as third party
interventions (Cichowski 2016). It is appropriate to point out, however, that an in-depth
understanding of how actors mobilize Convention law within member states with
fewer violations—often those states in which human rights protections are most
entrenched—is lacking.
Conventional wisdom might lead an observer to expect that cross-national
differences in the quality and functionality of human rights protections are reflected in
the violation rates of each government. In other words, one might expect that actors
within states with the best human rights practices are simply motivated less often to
petition the ECtHR because fewer human rights violations take place. However, taking
into account the documented use of strategic litigation at the Court to achieve
supranational human rights policy reform and Kelemen’s argument that regional
integration can spur policy actors to pursue their interests via litigation (Solvang 2008;
Kelemen 2006), it is reasonable to question the logic that a demand for redress—or lack
thereof—is what defines civil society involvement in ECtHR cases in states where fewer
human rights violations occur.
States with fewer allegations of human rights—today they are typically longstanding democracies in Western Europe given social and political divisions during the
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Cold War era—often host the societal actors that are most equipped to mobilize
international law, with unequal access to financial and professional resources required
to use it (Conant 2016; Börzel 2006). The marked availability of such resources within
long-standing democracies in Europe coincides with a longer history of belonging to
and operating within regional bodies like the Council of Europe compared to former
Soviet states, leading scholars such as Conant to believe that the legal consciousness of
individuals and organizations can inform their decisions to mobilize international law
(2016). In long-standing European democracies where the legal consciousness of civil
society actors is likely to be higher, the enforceability and accessibility of ECtHR
judgments, combined with available financial and legal resources could very well
attract actors to litigate for reasons beyond the attainment of moral and financial
redress.
Here, it is appropriate to clarify that the judgments delivered by the Court by
nature deliver a degree of moral or financial redress (when just satisfaction is awarded)
where a violation is found. However, the fact that civil society actors can participate in
Court proceedings, not only by making a rights claim to hold a responding government
accountable, but also by representing a claimant or as a third party intervener,
demonstrates the multiplicity of interests that can be represented as judges interpret
and apply the Convention. Considering these dynamics, I argue that, as human rights
in Europe become increasingly judicialized, there will be increased opportunity for civil
society organizations to pursue their policy goals through strategic litigation at the
European Court of Human Rights.
The remainder of this study demonstrates strategic litigation at the ECtHR in
long-standing democracies by employing a multi-method analytical design. An
overview of participation by civil society organizations (CSOs) at the ECtHR concerning
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cases originating in Germany and The Netherlands is provided, using descriptive
analysis of an exhaustive data set detailing instances of CSO involvement in cases
against these states. A comparative case study analysis of civil society mobilization
around questions of freedom of speech and privacy in both states follows, providing an
example of the dynamics of strategic litigation at the ECtHR and supporting the
argument that, in long-standing democracies, participation by civil society
organizations in international human rights judicial politics should not only be
approached as litigation for redress, but also in some cases as strategic litigation along
policy preferences.

Data & Methods
The European Court of Human Rights creates a data rich environment that
facilitates the systematic exploration of civil society participation in international
judicial politics. The Court is the judicial body of the Council of Europe and is located in
Strasbourg, France. Set up in 1959 by the then 13 member states to rule on alleged
violations of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Court has since expanded
to include a population of 830 million inhabitants in 47 member states, all of which are
bound to enforce ECtHR rulings. It is the most active international court in the world,
having made more than 18,000 judgements since its establishment and receiving more
than 40,000 applications in 2020 alone (“Analysis of Statistics 2020” 2021). The unique
accessibility of the ECtHR is one of its defining characteristics; states, individuals,
groups of individuals, and organizations residing in any member state can bring claims
of Convention violations to the Court. But despite the Court’s unprecedented progress
in expanding human rights protections across the region, we have yet to understand the
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processes by which civil society actors in long-standing democracies participate in the
significant political and legal reforms that ECtHR judgements can oftentimes initiate.
This study includes a multi-method research design, employing both qualitative
and quantitative analytic methods. A data set detailing CSO participation in ECtHR
judgements against Germany and The Netherlands and a comparative case study
analysis were used to explore how civil society organizations participate in
international judicial politics. Descriptive analysis of the data set was selected as a
method in order to gain an aggregate-level understanding of how civil society
organizations are active before the Court and the comparative case study analysis
enables an in-depth examination of the dynamics of civil society participation. A
combination of data from the two sources provides an illustrative picture of CSO
participation in ECtHR cases in long-standing democracies. The procedures for each
method are described in turn below.
Data Set
In order to first understand how CSOs interact with international judicial politics
in long-standing democracies, a data set detailing all instances of CSO participation in
cases against Germany and The Netherlands before the ECtHR was constructed.
Participation, for the purposes of this data set, was defined to consist of three possible
modes: serving as direct claimant, submitting a third-party intervention (amicus curiae
report), or providing counsel to a direct claimant. Germany and The Netherlands were
selected for analysis on the basis of three factors: their long-standing membership in the
Council of Europe (from 1952 and 1954, respectively); their status as long-standing
democracies, as each country was an original signatory of the Convention (Duranti
2017); and their remarkable compliance with ECtHR judgements.
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Data for the data set were drawn from two sources. First, instances of CSO
participation in cases against Germany and The Netherlands were isolated from
Cichowski and Chrun’s European Court of Human Rights Database (ECHRdb), which
includes more than 15,000 judgements by the ECtHR from 1960-2014 and identifies
interest and advocacy participation in the cases (Cichowski and Chrun 2017). No similar
database could be identified. Second, because the ECHRdb includes information
through 2014, the Council of Europe’s full text online database of judicial decisions,
HUDOC [accessible at: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int], was used update the data to
include judgements delivered through 2019. Participating actors and their mode of
involvement are defined in the procedure section of each case document and were
easily identified and recorded. Altogether, the data set includes 123 instances of interest
and advocacy group participation in 63 different ECtHR judgements.
Case Study Selection
Following the construction of the data set, descriptive analysis of CSO
participation at the ECtHR was used to facilitate case study selection in order to
examine the particular dynamics that define how actors are involved with Court
rulings. The comparative case study concerning Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention was
selected on the basis of two factors. First, mobilization in both Germany and The
Netherlands around cases concerning these articles was comparatively high, enabling
cross-country comparison. Second, descriptive analysis of the data set indicated that
CSOs mobilized to support the German government’s position in 12 of the 28
judgments concerning the two articles in which Germany was the responding
government. This figure is contrasted by cases in the same issue-areas raised against
The Netherlands, where no such instances can be found.
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Analysis
Overview of Context of CSO Participation in Long-Standing Democracies
A civil society organization can formally participate in cases at the European
Court of Human Rights in one of three ways. First, a CSO may access the Court as a
petitioner (also commonly referred to as claimant, litigant, or defendant) by submitting
an application to the ECtHR once all domestic legal remedies have been exhausted. The
Court examines the merits of applications under the Convention and decides whether
the case can be ruled on. If the case is deemed admissible, the respondent government
becomes the party held liable for the alleged abuse, regardless of the defendant in the
domestic proceedings. Second, CSOs can participate in ECtHR cases by providing legal
counsel to petitioners, which is common practice for a number of specialized HROs that
house lawyers specifically trained for casework at the ECtHR (Sundstrom 2014). Third,
CSOs can be a ‘third party’ to Court cases as an amicus curiae (also commonly referred to
as third party intervener). The two modes of participation most relevant to this study
are petitioning the Court and submitting a third party intervention. In only two cases
before Germany and one case before The Netherlands did a CSO provide counsel for
the petitioner, so although this practice was observed, the focus of this analysis lies on
the two more salient modes of participation.
Descriptive analysis of data set
Descriptive analysis of the data set indicated that interest groups were involved
in 9.09% of total judgments delivered against The Netherlands, compared to 12.64%
involvement in judgments against Germany. Comparative figures are shown in Table 1.
It is fitting to underline that these figures include interest group involvement in cases
that led to judgments and that such involvement could be in support of the state or the
petitioner. Differentiation of this pattern of involvement shows that, of the 12.64% of
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Table 1. Civil Society Organization Participation in ECtHR Cases against Germany and The
Netherlands
Germany

% of Judgments

The Netherlands

% of Judgments

Total judgments

348

--

165

--

Total participating
CSOs

60

--

42

--

Judgments with
CSO participation

44

12.64

15

9.09

Judgments where
CSO supported
litigant

18

5.17

4

2.42

Judgments where
CSO supported state

18

5.17

0

0.00

Judgments where
CSO was litigant

11

3.16

10

6.06

Source: Data compiled by the author from the ECHRdb (Cichowski and Chrun 2017) and
HUDOC (accessible at: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng).
judgments against Germany that included organizational participation, 5.17% of
instances were in support of the state, meanwhile there were no such instances in cases
against the Netherlands. Discounting such cases from the comparison of legal
mobilization of interest groups against each country, it appears that the Dutch cases
show greater overall proportional mobilization (with greater instances of interest
groups as litigants [6.06%] than as third-party or counsel of petitioner [2.42%]), while
the participation of interest groups in German cases seldom is as a petitioner (3.16%)
and is more often in support of petitioners (5.17%).
Individual characteristics of the participating interest groups shed light on
interesting variations. There were 60 different organizations involved in cases against
Germany from 1959-2019 and 42 involved in Dutch cases. Because of the significantly
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lower quantity of judgments made against The Netherlands compared to those against
Germany, 165 and 348 respectively, there appears to be greater salience of interest
group involvement in cases against The Netherlands using the proportion of the total
number of organizations involved to the total number of cases against each country in
the dataset as a measure.
Table 2. Civil Society Organizations Participating in ECtHR Cases against Germany and The
Netherlands by Type
Germany

% of CSOs

The Netherlands

% of CSOs

Domestic
organizations

40

66.67

21

50.00

Companies

14

35.00

22

52.38

Rights
organizations

7

11.67

15

35.71

Professional
associations

4

6.67

2

4.67

Religious
organizations

19

31.67

0

0.00

Source: Data compiled by the author from the ECHRdb (Cichowski and Chrun 2017) and
HUDOC (accessible at: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng).
This analysis demonstrates that 66% of the organizational participants in German
cases were domestic groups, while only 50% of participants in Dutch cases originated in
The Netherlands. It could be interesting to further decompose this data to reveal
possible variations in the party that was supported by these groups. It may be that
domestic are more likely to support the state, not the petitioner, which could lead to
important conclusions.
Further breaking down this data to reveal the different types of groups that
mobilized around the cases (see Table 2) reveals that companies are more likely to be
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involved in cases against The Netherlands, followed by rights organizations, while the
involvement in German cases demonstrates strong mobilization from both private
companies and from religious organizations. The characteristics of these groups could
lead to interesting conclusions, especially regarding the nature of religious
organizations in Germany and their relation to the state. Perhaps a framework of
systems under neo-corporatist governance could be useful as a conceptual point of
departure to explain these variations (Vanhala 2016).
Table 3. Non-state Group Actor Involvement in German ECtHR Litigation by Article

Source: Data compiled by the author from the ECHRdb (Cichowski and Chrun 2017) and
HUDOC (accessible at: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng).
Tables 3 and 4 compare legal mobilization by CSOs in each state broken down by
issue area and the party supported. CSO participation in ECtHR cases against Germany
(Table 4) is highest concerning Articles 8 (right to privacy), 9 (freedom of thought,
religion), and 10 (freedom of expression) of the Convention and it is appropriate to call
attention to the frequency in which participating CSOs support the German
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government in these cases. More than half of CSO participation in Article 8 judgments
was in support of the state and in several cases concerning Articles 6 (right to a fair
trial) 9, 10, 11 (freedom of assembly), and 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the
Convention similar support for the state is observed. The submission of amicus briefs in
support of the respondent state is perhaps one of the most interesting findings of this
descriptive analysis, as a number of scholars have called attention to how the practice is
widely used to support human rights victims (Bartholomeusz 2005; Cichowski 2016;
Van den Eynde 2013).
Table 4. Non-state Group Actor Involvement in Dutch ECtHR Litigation by Article

Source: Data compiled by the author from the ECHRdb (Cichowski and Chrun 2017) and
HUDOC (accessible at: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng).
CSO participation in ECtHR cases against The Netherlands (Table 4)
demonstrates less variation. In no cases did CSOs support the Dutch government and
participation is concentrated around Articles 6, 8, and 10. In these cases, CSOs
supported the petitioner in amicus curiae briefs or appeared in the case as the petitioner.

KOVARIK 19
This is perhaps the sort of pattern one might expect to observe in CSO participation in
cases concerning long-standing democracies at the ECtHR; the few instances where
CSOs did participate, they petitioned the Court to hold the Dutch government
accountable for rights abuses or supported the petitioner in their cause.
Given that in cases against both Germany and The Netherlands participation was
high concerning Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention, these two issue-areas were
selected for further analysis to understand why in some cases CSOs mobilized in
support Germany, while in The Netherlands such type of participation was not present.
The following section explores this variation in depth.

Strategic Litigation at the ECtHR
The German Case
The loose network of actors mobilizing around cases against Germany
concerning Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention is concentrated around five distinct
cases, which can be grouped by litigant. Table 5 illustrates the cases under study, the
actors involved, and their mode of involvement. Caroline von Hannover, the Princess of
Monaco, was the litigant in the first two cases (Von Hannover v. Germany and Von
Hannover v. Germany [No. 2]); Axel Springer AG, a large German publishing company,
was the litigant of the following two cases (Axel Springer AG v. Germany and Axel
Springer AG v. Germany [No. 2]) and the final case, along with another German media
company, RTL Television GmbH (Axel Springer SE and RTL Television GmbH v.
Germany).

KOVARIK 20
Table 5. CSO Participation in Article 8 and 10 Cases against Germany
Non-state group actor

Mode of participation

Case
Von Hannover
v. Germany

Association of German Magazine
Publishers

Berlin

Hurbert Burda Media GmbH & Co. KG

Munich

Von Hannover
v. Germany
(no. 2)

WZV Wesrdeutsche Zeitshriftenverlag
GmbH & Co. KG

Dusseldorf

Ehrlich & Sohn GmbH & Co. KG
Hamburg

Media Lawyer’s Association

Axel Springer AG
v. Germany

Tbilisi

Media Legal Defence Initiative
London

International Press Institute

Axel Springer AG
v. Germany

Vienna

World Association
Newspapers & News Publications
Paris

RTL Television GmbH

Axel Springer AG
v. Germany

Cologne

Axel Springer AG
Berlin

Actor supports state

Actor supports petitioner

Actor is petitioner

Source: Data compiled by the author from full-text case documents available on HUDOC
(accessible at: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng).
The first two cases under analysis were taken up under Article 8 of the
Convention, the right to respect for private and family life, by Princess of Monaco
Caroline von Hannover. Von Hannover had been seeking injunctions against the
publication of photos taken of her in her private life, eating at restaurants, at the beach
with her children or completing other normal activities for some time before petitioning
the ECtHR. In Von Hannover v. Germany, the applicant complained that constant
harassment by the press resulted in a violation of her right to respect for private and
family life and argued that the German courts’ decision that, as a public figure, she was
not entitled to privacy outside of a ‘secluded place’ was insufficient to guarantee her
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Article 8 protections because of a narrowly defined legal concept of the term ‘secluded
place’.
The Association of German Magazine Publishers submitted a third party
intervention in support of the German government, referencing a resolution by the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe which highlighted the important role
of the press in democratic society. The organization argued that the “watchdog” role of
the press could not be narrowly interpreted and that the State should have a wide
margin of appreciation in the area. Hubert Burda Media (a German publishing
company) also supported the German government and stated that pubic figures of
contemporary society enjoyed sufficient protections under German law and that the
German courts frequently reinforced that protection. The Court held, however, that
there was a violation of Article 8, stating that domestic German courts had not
sufficiently protected the applicant’s right to private and family life.
In this case, the amicus briefs by the Association of German Magazine Publishers
and Hubert Burda Media are interesting in that they represent the obvious interest of
the media in the potentially broad political ramifications of the case. In fact, as a result
of the Court’s ruling in Von Hannover v. Germany, the freedoms of the press to report on
public figures were significantly diminished so that public figures could generally rely
on privacy unless acting in an official function, which “had grave effects on the media
that heavily relies on the images of celebrities, including members of the royalty and the
aristocracy” (Westkamp 2012).
The second and related case, Von Hannover v. Germany (No. 2), resulted from the
applicant’s allegation that the Court’s prior ruling had not been enforced and that she
and her family continued to suffer harassment and lack of privacy on behalf of the
German media. The German government argued that decisions by domestic courts had
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taken up the previous judgment of the Court (concerning the case of Von Hannover v.
Germany [No. 1]). It also argued that the state should enjoy a wide margin of
appreciation in such cases, needing only to show that it had considered a balance of
competing interests of the private person, public figures and the press. The Association
of German Magazine Editors likewise submitted that the German courts had factored
the Court’s previous ruling into their decisions and that the press enjoyed much less
freedom as a result. The German media company Ehrlich & Sohn GmbH highlighted
the important role the press plays in successful democracy and reiterated the
applicant’s status as a public figure. It also underlined the severe curtailment of the
freedom of information and of the press since the Court’s prior judgment. The Media
Lawyers Association based in Tbilisi argued that states must enjoy a wide margin of
appreciate when balancing competing interests of individual privacy and public debate
and that the Court should only intervene where courts failed to balance those interests.
The Media Legal Defence Initiative, International Press Institute and the World
Association of Newspapers and News Publishers, based in London, Vienna, and Paris,
respectively, submitted jointly that Contracting States should enjoy a wide margin of
appreciation when balancing competing interests, referencing several earlier Court
decisions. The parties argued that the Court would risk becoming a court of appeals for
future similar cases. The Court held that there was no violation of Article 8 and
observed that the German courts had undertaken considerable analysis of the Court’s
case-law following the initial Von Hannover ruling. The Court found that the German
government had in fact sufficiently complied with its prior ruling and that there was no
violation in the second case. The case of Von Hannover v. Germany (No. 2) attracted
mobilization in support of the German government’s position by German media
companies and freedom of speech nonprofits alike, who recognized the further
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diminished press freedoms that could result should the Court rule in Von Hannover’s
favor.
The final three cases are different in that they dealt with Article 10 (the right to
freedom of expression) and they were brought forth by media companies. In Axel
Springer AG v. Germany, the applicant company complained of an injunction on the
publication of an article detailing the drug-related arrest and prosecution of a wellknown German actor. The German government argued that it had considered the
Court’s judgment in the Von Hannover v. Germany case, which required domestic courts
to balance the competing rights and interests of the individual, the press and the public
and reiterated that it should enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in determining
proportionality of such cases.
The applicant company argued that the actor was very well-known and that a
criminal offense was never a truly private matter. It stated that all of the information
published in the article in question had also been made publicly available in a press
release by the prosecutor’s office. The company argued that the press must be allowed
to report on prominent persons that seek to establish or maintain a public image of
themselves and to correct that image when necessary. The Media Lawyers Association
supported the applicant company and submitted that the right to reputation was not
protected under the Convention, that the press was obligated to report on all matters of
public interest, including judicial proceedings of persons of interest, where identifiable
information is crucial to the task of informing the public. The association also cited a
United Kingdom Supreme Court ruling that determined that the exclusion of names
from reports on criminal proceedings stripped them of any public utility. The
association concluded that, outside of situations where defendant or witness anonymity
had to be protected, there should be no restriction on the reporting of court
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proceedings. The Media Legal Defence Initiative, International Press Institute and
World Association of Newspaper and News Publishers submitted a joint statement
highlighting a broad trend among Contracting States to consider the Court’s standards
regarding the balancing of Article 8 and Article 10 rights. The associations invited the
Court to grant a wide margin of appreciation to the Contracting States on the issue,
ensuring only that states had a domestic mechanism in place to consider a balance of
Article 8 and 10 rights in similar cases. The Court concluded that there had been a
violation of Article 10 of the Convention and awarded the applicant company just over
50,000 euros in respect of pecuniary damages and costs and expenses. In this case, the
Media Lawyers Association, Media Legal Defence Initiative, International Press
Institute, and World Association of Newspaper and News Publishers were critical of the
prior rulings by the German courts and pushed against the restrictions on press
freedoms that they imposed, which were ultimately reversed with the Court’s decision.
In the case of Axel Springer AG v. Germany (No. 2), The applicant company
complained of the prevention of the publication of two sentences in the mass-circulation
daily newspaper Bild that questioned the motives of former Federal Chancellor Gerhard
Schröder for calling for early elections. The domestic courts found that the applicant
company had not fulfilled its journalistic duties in the elaboration of the article,
particularly for failing to include counter statements from Mr. Schröder. The applicant
company submitted that it had reached out to Mr. Schröder’s office three times before
finally receiving a response indicating that Mr. Schröder had no comments to add. The
German government submitted that the applicant company did not fairly represent the
information surrounding the circumstance, pointing out that serious allegations must
be accompanied by a rigorous factual basis. The Media Legal Defence Initiative
submitted that media outlets could not be responsible for carrying out investigations to
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back every quote by third parties—especially a prominent politician. The organization
also underlined the risks associated with reaching out to parties referred to in a report,
especially if they had interest in stifling its publication or preventing public debate
concerning them. Moreover, the organization pointed out that questions in early reports
are often answered in later reports. The Court found that there was not sufficient need
to protect former Chancellor Schröder’s reputation above the applicant company’s
freedom of expression and that a violation of Article 10 had occurred. The applicant
company was awarded 36,000 euros for legal costs.
In the case of Axel Springer SE and RTL Television GmbH v. Germany, the applicant
companies complained that a judicial order that banned the publication of photos or
videos that identified a defendant with schizoid personality disorder who killed his
parents resulted in a violation of Article 10. The German government submitted that the
order preventing the publication of identifiable photos and videos was necessary to
protect the privacy rights of the defendant, who merited heightened protection
considering he suffered from a psychiatric disorder. The government argued that the
dissemination of images of the defendant in association with the crime violated
principles of “presumption of innocence”. The applicant companies argued that there
was no legal basis for the judicial ban and, considering that the defendant had
confessed to the crime both at the initial crime scene and during the first day of legal
proceedings—which were not closed to the public—, the ban had gone too far. The
Court concluded that no violation of Article 10 had taken place, noting that the judicial
ban was proportionate to the protection of the defendant and “necessary in a
democratic society”.
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The Dutch Case
The network of actors mobilizing around cases against The Netherlands
concerning Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention is concentrated around three distinct
cases. Table 6 illustrates the cases under study, the actors involved, and their mode of
involvement. Unlike the network of actors involved in cases against Germany, there are
no repeat players in the Dutch cases.
Table 6. CSO Participation in Article 8 and 10 Cases against The Netherlands

Source: Data compiled by the author from full-text case documents available on HUDOC
(accessible at: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng).
The first case under analysis, Vereniging Weekblad Bluf! V. The Netherlands, is a
rather standard case before the Court, involving routine application of Convention law.
The applicant company complained that a search and seizure and subsequent
withdrawal of publications prepared for distribution on the grounds of national
security interests resulted in a violation of their right to freedom of expression under
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Article 10 of the Convention. The government argued that the materials published,
although already distributed to an extent, were still subject to secrecy as the details in
the report resulted in a breach of national security interests. The Court held that there
had been a violation of Article 10 and awarded 60,000 Netherlands guilders to the
applicant company. This case involved a rather specific interpretation of Convention
law and its ruling did not lead to any important policy development.
The second case under analysis, however, Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. The
Netherlands, involved a question of the confidentiality of journalistic sources, which
significantly effects the work of the media. The applicant company complained that the
Dutch government had violated their Article 10 rights by compelling the provision of
information that would allow the identification of journalistic sources.
Journalists from the applicant company had attended an illegal street race and,
after coming to an agreement with the attendees and ensuring complete anonymity,
took photos and videos to later de-identify and use for publication. The police and
prosecuting authorities later suspected that one of the cars that appeared in the street
race had previously been involved as the getaway car for a crime compelled the
applicant company to release the photo and video evidence against his will. The
government disputed that an agreement of anonymity had ever occurred, citing the
public nature of the illegal street race and the large number of attendees and argued
that the applicant company could not possibly be under any duty of confidentiality.
Additionally, the government submitted that the seized evidence was never intended to
be used in connection to the illegal street race, but rather for a crime previously
committed which was not protected by any anonymity agreement. The applicant
company submitted that verbal agreement of anonymity had taken place, and that they
could not realistically be expected to have produced a written agreement. Three
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freedom of speech organizations (The London-based Media Legal Defence Initiative
and Article 19 and New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists) one human rights
organization (New York-based Open Society Justice Initiative) and one British media
company (Guardian News and Media Ltd.) supported the petitioner and submitted
comparative law information, arguing that only courts can make decisions compelling
the handing over of confidential journalistic sources. The Court held that a violation of
Article 10 had taken place and directed the Dutch government to pay 35,000 euros to
the applicant company.
In this case, the Court’s ruling that there had been a violation of Article 10 was
crucial for the media to maintain its ability to ensure source anonymity. Without strong
guarantees for journalistic sources to remain anonymous, it would be difficult-toimpossible for the press to gather and share important information. The freedom of
speech organizations, rights organization, and media company that submitted third
party interventions in support of the petitioner made this explicit in their remarks.
The final case against Netherlands under analysis, Telegraaf Media Nederland
Landelijke Media B.V. and Others v. The Netherlands, again focuses around a similar
question as the case of Vereniging Weekblad Bluf! V. The Netherlands. The applicants, who
had acquired through a leak a confidential Dutch secret service report, complained that
its seizure and their subsequent surveillance violated their rights as protected by
Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention. The government argued that the measures were
necessary to protect national security interests, considering that a leak of confidential
state information had occurred. The applicants argued that they were not directly
related to the leak, thus they could not legally be subject to the special powers of the
secret service that violated their rights. The Court determined that there had been a
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violation of Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention and ordered the government to pay the
applicants EUR 60,000 for costs and expenses.
Discussion
Analysis of the cases summarized above leads to interesting findings regarding
the role of civil society organizations in cases against long-standing democracies at the
ECtHR. Mobilization around the two Von Hannover cases against Germany in support
of the state demonstrate that civil society organizations in the media sector from
London to Vienna to Tbilisi are conscious of the possible implications of Court
judgments on their sector. Likewise, the freedom of speech organizations that mobilized
to support the petitioner in the two Axel Springer AG v. Germany cases acted to promote
the interests of the media where Convention law had the opportunity for development.
Perhaps an interesting finding of the study of these German cases is that there was no
additional organizational mobilization in the case of Axel Springer SE and RTL Television
GmbH v. Germany, possibly because the judicial ban by the German courts that was at
the heart of the case was discrete in that it had no further policy implications beyond
the case in question.
The pattern of participation by media organizations in this set of cases is
consistent with a strategic litigation approach. Organizations are observed to mobilize
in a mode that is consistent with their policy preferences when opportunities for policy
development arise. In the Von Hannover cases, as the petitioner’s claim constituted a
threat to the freedom of the media to use images of public figures, media organizations
strategically submitted amicus curiae reports in support of the state. The Axel Springer
cases, in contrast, presented instances where the state had taken measures imposing
upon the freedom of the media to report on public figures and, recognizing the
imposition upon that freedom, media organizations submitted amicus reports
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supporting the position of the petitioner. When little opportunity for legal development
is present, as with Axel Springer SE and RTL Television GmbH v. Germany, it is of little
strategic value to mobilize and no additional actors are involved.
The same seems to be true for the first case in the Dutch set. In Vereniging
Weekblad Bluf! V. The Netherlands, the core question of the case is whether the seizure of
publications with confidential information that had already been widely circulated was
a violation of Convention law. The specific nature of the case (pertaining to the specific
confidential information in question) did not entail significant development of the
application of Article 10 and no organizations mobilized as third parties. However, in
the case of Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. The Netherlands, the Court’s decision had the
potential to establish precedent regarding the extent to which anonymity could be
provided to journalistic sources, which would result in considerable legal impacts for
media actors throughout the Court’s jurisdiction. This case accordingly attracts strong
mobilization by five organizations who were critical of the Dutch government’s
position. The case of Telegraaf Media Nederland Landelijke Media B.V. and Others v. The
Netherlands, again involves a similar question as the first case, a rather routine
application of Convention law, and demonstrates no third party organizational
mobilization.
In considering the German set of cases and the Dutch set of cases in tandem, a
common phenomenon is that the cases with the greatest opportunity for policy
development are those which demonstrate highest salience of participation by civil
society organizations. Concerning Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention, relating to
questions of privacy and freedom of speech, it is not surprising that mobilizing
organizations are largely freedom of speech organizations, media companies, and
professional journalistic associations. In these cases, particularly those in which CSOs
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support the position of the respondent government, moral and financial redress does
not seem to define organizational participation. Rather, these organizations are strategic
in their litigation at the European Court of Human Rights, adapting their mode of
participation according to their policy preferences.

Conclusion
While the possibility of obtaining moral and financial redress for human rights
violations is certainly a defining characteristic of litigation at the European Court of
Human Rights, this analysis demonstrates that civil society organizations also employ
strategic litigation to participate in cases according to their policy preferences. The
network of freedom of speech and media organizations that mobilized in support of the
German government in Von Hannover v. Germany and Von Hannover v. Germany (No. 2)
acted to preserve loose privacy protections for persons of public interest and similar
mobilization in support of the petitioner in the Axel Springer v. Germany cases served to
counter efforts by the state to regulate information reported by the media. Notably, the
case of Sanoma Uitgevers v. The Netherlands presented an opportunity for the Court to
clarify the extent to which anonymity can be provided to journalistic sources—a
potentially impactful legal development for journalistic organizations throughout the
COE member states—and a number of media organizations mobilized to prevent a
restrictive legal development regulating that practice. The cases that presented little
opportunity for impactful interpretations of Convention law (Axel Spring SE and RTL
Television GmbH v. Germany; Vereniging Weekblad Bluf! V. The Netherland; and Telegraaf
Media Nederland Landelijke Media B.V. and Others v. The Netherlands) were also those that
did not attract participation by third party organizations. Media companies, freedom of
speech organizations, and even broader rights organizations are likely cognizant of the
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important policy developments that can follow ECtHR rulings and employ strategic
litigation to pursue their policy interests at the venue when opportunity for
development arises.
The finding that the European Court of Human Rights serves as a venue of last
resort not only for victims of human rights violations to receive financial and moral
redress, but also for civil society actors to pursue their policy interests in relation to the
interpretation of Convention law is an important addition to our understanding of
participation in international judicial politics. The question that remains unanswered,
however, is what factors make an actor’s use of strategic litigation at the European
Court of Human Rights more likely. The cases included in this analysis suggest that
civil society organizations may be more likely to use strategic litigation at the ECtHR
when a pending case presents the opportunity for a significant legal development
within their relevant issue-area, but why do cases in some issue-areas attract more
attention by civil society actors than others (e.g., Articles 8 and 10 in cases against
Germany and The Netherlands)? Another pressing question in light of the findings of
the current study is how to determine if an actor’s participation at the ECtHR is
motivated by a desire for redress, a larger political strategy, or a combination of both.
Elite, semi-structured interviews conducted by the author of this study between
October and December, 2020 with seven human rights practitioners—NGO
professionals and lawyers—will be analyzed and used in an attempt to answer the
questions above in a forthcoming paper. Preliminary analysis of interview data suggests
that transnational dynamics such as the export of human rights advocacy and informal
NGO networks can influence instances of strategic litigation at the ECtHR, as well as
the availability—or lack thereof—of alternative forums to promote policy preferences.
Additionally, many interview respondents commented on how the post-Soviet export
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of human rights advocacy from Western European countries to countries in Eastern
Europe may have resulted in astonishing differences in how civil society actors in
distinct geographic and cultural settings participate in international judicial politics.
Nonetheless, in light of the finding of strategic litigation at the ECtHR, it is also
fitting to consider its implications for the fulfillment of democratic principles in the
creation of supranational human rights policy. Similar to the findings laid out in several
previous works, the findings of this study suggest that the judicialization of
international human rights in Europe has resulted in enhanced opportunity for
participation in international policymaking (Cichowski 2006a; Alter 2006; Börzel 2006).
Civil society organizations can and do access the ECtHR to make their policy
preferences and the possible wider implications of Court decisions known. However,
marked geographic and thematic variation in participation in cases at the ECtHR
difficult the drawing of normative conclusions. A larger-scale study of strategic
litigation, including both weaker democratic states committing more human rights
violations and long-standing democracies that are less active before the Court, could
reveal additional effects of such an approach and its use beyond long-standing
democracies. The highly judicialized nature of human rights in Europe certainly serves
as a promising model for the involvement of private actors in supranational policy
development. Given the stark geographical and thematic differences in the nature of
that involvement, however, the question of who it benefits remains unanswered.
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